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MODEL RULE 1.0: LAWYERS ARE MORALLY
ACCOUNTABLE
Russell G. Pearce*
Deborah Rhode's recent book, In the Interests of Justice:
Reforming the Legal Profession,' offers a bleak account of the legal
profession at the start of the twenty-first century. Lawyers have
tremendous responsibility for the administration of justice; yet they
refuse to accept moral accountability for their actions. This essay
explores whether the legal profession should address this problem, at
least in part, through the addition of a Model Rule 1.0, which would
hold lawyers morally accountable for their conduct. This Rule would
not dictate a particular moral vision. Rather, it would direct lawyers
with sometimes conflicting understandings of their role to wrestle with
the moral implications of their conduct both as individuals and as a
community.
Among elite lawyers, the dominance of the notion that lawyers are
not morally responsible for the quality of justice in society is relatively
recent. Through the 1960s, most elite lawyers viewed themselves as
America's disinterested governing class with a special obligation to
promote the public good.2 After the 1960s, the dominant perspective
changed as lawyers rejected responsibility for the public good in favor
of client advocacy. Murray Schwartz and David Luban have
described the current standard conception of the lawyer's role as
having two elements: "extreme partisanship" on behalf of the client
and "moral non-accountability" for the lawyer's actions in pursuit of
the client's goals.' As Richard Wasserstrom has noted, under this
conception the lawyer becomes "an amoral technician. "5
* Professor of Law and Co-Director, Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics, Fordham
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1. Deborah L. Rhode, In the Interests of Justice: Reforming the Legal Profession
(2000).
2. Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers As America's Governing Class: The Formation and
Dissolution of the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer's Role, 8 U. Chi. L
Sch. Roundtable 381 (2001). While some members of the elite challenged this notion,
they found themselves on the margin of the profession. Id. at 383.
3. Id at 383-84.
4. David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study 20 (1988) (suggesting
that extreme partisanship and moral non-accountability are basic principles of lawyer
ideology); Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers,
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This shift to an amoral perspective is not necessary to justifty
zealous advocacy. Monroe Freedman is an excellent example of the
zealous advocate with a deeply moral conception of the lawyer's role.
He instructs lawyers and students that they "should be conscious...
of how [their] own decisions on issues of lawyers' ethics establish
[their] moral priorities and thereby define [their] own moral profile." 6
In Freedman's view, a moral understanding of the lawyer's role
requires zealous representation, moral counseling, and moral
evaluation of whether to represent a client. He describes lawyers as
having personal moral responsibility for their decision to represent a
client,7 but "[o]nce the lawyer has chosen to accept responsibility to
represent a client.., the zealousness of that representation cannot be
tempered by the lawyer's moral judgments of the client or of the
client's cause."' For Freedman, this zealous representation is not an
amoral act. It is "essential... to maintain[ing] a free society"9 and
promoting "the effective exercise of individual autonomy."'" From
this perspective, an "attorney acts... immorally by... preempting
[clients'] moral decisions, or by depriving them of the ability to carry
out their lawful decisions."" At the same time, the identification and
pursuit of client goals requires the lawyer to "counsel[ her] clients
candidly and fully regarding the clients'... moral responsibilities as
the lawyer perceives them."12
Although Freedman has a well-developed moral conception of
zealous advocacy, most lawyers do not. Unlike Freedman, most
lawyers appear to have generalized the notion of moral non-
accountability to all aspects of their role as lawyers.13 Rhode notes
that only one-fifth of lawyers believe that their work "contribut[es] to
the social good. 14 She identifies the "sense that they have not been
able to pursue justice" as "a primary source of career dissatisfaction
among surveyed attorneys." 5  Freedman, too, acknowledges the
66 Cal. L. Rev. 669, 671 (1978) (same).
5. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 Human
Rights 1, 6 (1975).
6. Monroe H. Freedman, Understanding Lawyers' Ethics 11 (1990). But see
Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and
Some Possibilities, 1986 Am. B. F. Res. J. 613 (arguing for the amoral perspective on
moral grounds).
7. Freedman supra note 6, at 49-50, 57.
8. Id. at 50.
9. Id. at 13.
10. Id. at 57.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See Rhode, supra note 1, at 65.
14. Id. at 8; see also id. at 11, 38.
15. Id. at 65.
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existence of "amorality and even immorality in the practice of many
lawyers."' 6
While vast literature exists addressing what should be done about
this problem, this essay offers a relatively simple proposal. Following
Rhode's suggestion that lawyers should "accept personal
responsibility for the moral consequences of their professional
actions,"' 7 Model Rule 1.0 would state only that "lawyers are morally
accountable for their conduct as lawyers." Making Rule 1.0 the first
rule would underscore its importance and would indicate that it
applies to all aspects of a lawyer's work. The Rule would be
aspirational, similar to Rule 6.1, which explains the lawyer's pro bono
responsibility,8 and would not define the term "morally," similar to
Rule 2.1, which authorizes lawyers to "refer [to] moral, economic,
social and political factors" in counseling clients.19 The goal of the
Rule would be to educate lawyers to their moral responsibility and to
encourage lawyers as individuals and as members of the legal
community to explore how their work "contribut[es] to the social
good."'
The use of the ethical rules to educate lawyers to their moral
responsibility falls squarely within the purposes of the ethics codes.2'
The Model Rules acknowledge that some of the rules are
"constitutive and descriptive [of] a lawyer's professional role" and
that they "serve to define" a lawyer's "relationship to our legal
system" which is "vital [to] the preservation of society."' Indeed,
precedent exists for enacting rules to encourage lawyers to accept
moral responsibility. The 1908 ABA Canons of Professional Ethics,
which sought to revive lawyers' commitment to the common good
through aspirational rules, instructed a lawyer to "obey his own
conscience and not that of his client,"' and to accept "responsibility
for advising as to questionable transactions, for bringing questionable
suits, [and] for urging questionable defenses." 24
In a similar vein, commentators have previously suggested rules of
conduct as a way to encourage lawyers' moral responsibility. In an
effort to temper moral non-accountability in transactional
representations, Murray Schwartz has proposed a Disciplinary Rule
16. See Freedman, supra note 6, at 50.
17. See Rhode, supra note 1, at 66-67.
18. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 6.1 (2001).
19. R. 2.1.
20. Rhode, supra note 1, at 8.
21. The actual function of the ethics codes is beyond the scope of this paper.
For excellent discussions of this topic, see Richard L Abel, Why Does the ABA
Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 Tex. L Rev. 639, 639 (1981); Deborah L Rhode,
Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 Tex.
L. Rev. 639, 689 (1981).
22. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct scope and pmbl. (2001).
23. Canons of Prof'l Ethics Canon 15 (1908).
24. Canon 31.
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prohibiting a lawyer from, inter alia, "assisting a client to gain 'an
unconscionable advantage over another person."'" William Simon
has more ambitiously sought to reshape legal ethics into "a
disciplinary regime consisting largely of contextual norms, and a set of
rules designed to encourage voluntary ethical commitments and
strengthen the forces that make for informal enforcement of such
commitments."26 Simon seeks to promote the view that "[lawyers
should take those actions that, considering the relevant circumstances
of the particular case, seem likely to promote justice. '27
In contrast, Model Rule 1.0 would not take sides in current disputes
regarding the lawyer's role. What it would do is move the debates
regarding the lawyer's moral duties, like that between Freedman, who
favors zealous representation, and Luban, Rhode, and Simon, who
favor some significant limits on that representation, to the center of
the bar's legal ethics conversations. While the bar currently pays
some slight attention to these issues, Model Rule 1.0 would move
them to a more prominent place in the bar's official deliberations and
continuing legal education courses, as well as in the efforts of the
conscientious lawyer to explore her own moral accountability.
Despite Model Rule 1.0's neutrality as to the competing visions of
the lawyer's proper role, some lawyers might fear that any embrace of
moral responsibility would undermine zealous advocacy. They might
argue that the representation of unpopular clients requires lawyers to
be able to tell themselves and the public that lawyers have no moral
responsibility for their conduct. Indeed, to facilitate representation of
''people ... whose cause is controversial or the subject of popular
disapproval," 8 Rule 1.2(b) provides that representation of a client
"does not constitute an endorsement of the client's... views or
activities. 29
But the argument that zealous advocacy requires an amoral defense
is unpersuasive. The Rules themselves certainly do not require moral
non-accountability. As a general matter, the Rules provide broad
latitude for lawyers to exercise moral discretion." Some rules even
expressly condone morally based conduct. Rule 2.1, for example,
provides that lawyers may counsel the client on "moral, economic,
social and political" considerations. 1 Nor does a policy justification
for representation of the unpopular require amorality. Even while
arguing that the decision whether to represent a client is an exercise of
25. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 688.
26. William H. Simon, The Practice of Justice: A Theory of Lawyers' Ethics 196
(1998).
27. Id. at 138.
28. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.2 cmt. (2001)
29. R. 1.2(b).
30. Bruce A. Green, The Role of Personal Values in Professional Decisionmaking,
11 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 19, 20 n.5 (1997).
31. See also R. 1.16.
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moral responsibility, Freedman makes a morally based argument that
the right of every person to counsel is "essential ... to a free
society. 3
2
Freedman also points out that the amoral justification is both
ineffective and unnecessary. It has not succeeded in protecting
lawyers who represent unpopular clients from "vilifi[cation], even by
other lawyers and judges. '3 3 Nor has it proved essential. In the most
notorious cases, there seems to be no shortage of lawyers. Freedman
notes that "[d]espite the harshest public denunciation, lawyers have
come forward to defend 'the meanest man in New York' and even to
support the right of Nazis to march in Skokie."-' Similarly, a New
York lawyer has recently obtained extensive news coverage by
publicly declaring his willingness to represent Osama bin Laden.-
By compelling zealous advocates or other representatives of the
unpopular to explain their conduct on moral grounds, Rule 1.0 will
not undermine their arguments and may make them more effective.
The public-and other lawyers and judges-are much more likely to
be persuaded (or at least less offended) by a moral justification of the
advocate's role, like that proposed by Freedman, than by the bald
assertion that "As a lawyer, I am not morally accountable."
Undoubtedly, though, Rule 1.0 would not suffice to prevent
criticism of those representing unpopular clients or to guarantee that
lawyers accept moral responsibility. It would, however, provide a
concrete step toward Rhode's prescription for practicing law "in the
interests of justice."36 As Rhode suggests, if lawyers acknowledge
their moral accountability, their personal and communal responsibility
for justice will become integral to their practice. 7
32. Freedman, supra note 6, at 68.
33. Id at 69; see also Rhode, supra note 1, at 75 (discussing an African-American
lawyer representing the KKK).
34. See Freedman, supra note 6, at 69. Freedman previously represented -Dr.
Bernard Bergman, a nursing-home owner who was... characterized in the press as
'The Meanest Man in New York."' Monroe Freedman, We Are Publicly Accountable,
Tex. Law., Sept. 27, 1993, at 18.
35. Dave Saltonstall, Lawyer Says He'd Defend Bin Laden, Daily News, Sept. 26,
2001, at 20.
36. See generally Rhode, supra note 1.
37. Id. at 17-18.
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